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THE NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE ARGUMENT FOB IMMORTALITY IK THE PHAEDRUS
One of the most condensed and abstruse arguments for soul's immortality
is to be found at Phaedrus 2 k ^ c - 2 k 6 a . It is not even clear whether 'soul* here
1 2  is meant to refer to soul collectively or to individual souls; perhaps it
3
refers to neither, but simply to 'soul in all its forms'. Certainly the very 
general form of the argument which follows would lead one to the latter 
conclusion, though 'soul* must still be understood as 'rational soul' or 
perhaps rational part of soul if one is to abide by the limiting characteristics 
outlined at 2 k 3 c 2 ~ k: 'our first step ... is to discern the nature of soul,
divine and human, its experiences and its activities.' If this description
has any meaning at all, the phrase can hardly refer to World Soul
||
(as Posidonius seems to have thought) nor can it include the souls of flies 
(as Harpocration seemed to thinkO« It must be the noetic soul, as Hermias 
saw,^ the ftu tv ·  ~ i t common to gods and men.^
Until recent times this argument for soul's immortality seemed to stem
7 ! 8
from an assertion that it was 'eternally moving' ( κ i To5 ). The 
discovery of an Oxyrhynchus papyrus, however, which read 'self-moving*
( (¿UTO uj T 05 )9 convinced Robin that this reading made much more sense of the
argument, and he duly incorporated it into the Bude text."^ The move has found 
a number of champions, notably Vollgraff, Bignone, Pasquali, Muller, Ross and 
more recently J. L. Ackrill.^ It is certainly true that with this reading one 
can reduce a complicated argument to the neater lines of an Aristotelian first- 
figure syllogism, but this in itself ought perhaps to be grounds for suspicion. 
As Diano has pointed out, is a word found nowhere else in Plato;
the first incontrovertible instance of its usage is at Aristotle, Phys. VIII,
5, 258a2. Plato tends rather to use phrases like 'that which moves itself'
\ 7 \ c V ^  } i
( To ¿«To retool/ )„ So it is at least possible that
is the gloss of some commentator interested in reducing Plato's looser arguments
to a more terse and respectable logical format. Be this as it may, the original
. I
reading ¿í i(o ought, I think, to be defended. The diffuse series of
arguments will then run as follows:
Introd. (= the argument in a nutshell)
) i ) ^
All soul is immortal, because it is «csiK'ii/^ T 05 , and anything
is immortal (245c5)·
> 7
The meaning and implications of the word o ¿ £ t are then brought 
out in two arguments:
-  2 -
1 .
2.
) C ' /~N
(i) To call anything Κ ιι /η Ί > \ /  ± q  to call it a K w o v v (c5-8)
(ii) For (a) if it were not a ¿.vt* κ ινο ύ ν there would be a cessation 
of life and movement (c6-7 )
(b) if it is a (¿¿Xo K \vw v there will never be any cessation
X» < V ^from movement, since a «¿u u k w o v v  never 1breaks contact* 
(c8) with itself (c7-8)
f \  c V ^ /
(iii) Unstated conclusion; k w i w  and ί , ι ι κ ι ν ^ τ ο ν are one, and
presumably immortal.
cf. the phrase 'it never ceases from being moved' (or; 'from 
moving itself')(c7-8 )
(i) The ^ u k Iv ^-voV never had a beginning, for it is a 'source of 
motion' ( κ ι ν η η ^  )(dl)
I
(d2-3 · explanation of why the notion of an should imply this.)
(ii) Qua it is also indestructible (d3-^)
(d4-6 : explanation of why the notion of an should also imply
this.)
A final argument links together the results of (l) and (2), corroborating 
them with a per impossibile consideration for good measure. It runs as 
follows ;
t! , \  I t \ ss
3. (l) The upshot ( ουτ uj )(d6 ) is that ¿pX1^ κιν^βΊ^ and ic»uo w
are one and the same (since both are identical with what is
eternally in motion)(d6-7 )
(ii) This entails (a) no cessation from being ) , n. .
) (d7-8 ) cf. dl-Λ above, 
(b) no coming into being }
(iii) Consider the odd results if it did not entail this] (d8-e2)
These results are now applied to the notion of soul itself, and the argument 
runs as follows;
c V rv
1. It has already been seen that the °cvzv fOv'-ou/ is immortal (i.e. by 
implication at the end of the argument (l) above)(e2-3)
2 . This will mean that soul, too, is immortal (e3-^)
For (a) body, whose movement is from without, is as such 'soulless'
) (eh -5 )
(b) soul has as its nature movement which is from within (e3-6 )
One must therefore conclude that iO vöu/ and soul are one and the3
- 3 -
*
same, and also (from dl-4 and d7-8 ) that soul will thereby be necessarily 
without beginning and immortal (e6-246a2)
> I
While Hackforth defends the original reading «ίί i K iz η'Το^ ' , he can 
hardly be right in assuming that it is an ài/cfoξ,oz serving as a major 
premiss, since the greater part of the argument is spent in elucidating it 
and outlining its implications. In Ackrill's words, 'it (i.e. the major 
premiss) can perfectly well express a proposition required for the main proof
14
though itself needing to be established by a subordinate proof.' This
'subordinate proof' in fact follows several stages:
) I c \ ^
1. The <rv is a ¿ vt* rfizoi/v' (c5-8).
2. A ¿«'t» tcizocz is immortal. (c5-e2).
f \  *\
3. Soul is a ¿zto K'tzouv , and thereby immortal. (e5 ff.).
In the argument as I have outlined it, the first two proofs are apodeictic,
C V ^
and each one sufficient of itself to show the immortality of «¿z-o» K'tvouv'· 
and k&nçivn.çu>v . But Plato chooses to stress their cumulative rather
than their individual plausibility (argument (3)), adding what Hermias 
calls an argument per impossibile for good measure ((3 )iii)."^
The argument, as many have pointed out, has much in common with the
l6>final argument for immortality in the Phaedo. But whereas that of the
Phaedo sprang from a metaphysic of Plato's own creation, the Phaedrus argument
is of a more empirical cast, and has its roots deep in the pre-Socratic 
17tradition. It also goes a long way towards solving difficulties presented 
by the psychology of the Phaedo. There the soul had been assimilated to the 
Ideas, and the hiatus between the unmoving Intelligible World and that of 
sensible things subject to motion had meant an inadequate explanation of the 
soul as we experience it in the world of movement. In the Phaedo he had 
found himself compelled to run in the face of all philosophic tradition, as 
part of his defence of his new-born metaphysic; the elementary attribute of 
all living things, movement, was quietly shelved, and the static, homogeneous, 
unchanging entity whose immortality he was left to prove was recognizable only 
to himself. Now soul is seen as the source of motion or activity, and a more 
balanced appreciation of its true nature is possible. This is not to argue, 
of course, that the notion of movement appears like a bolt from the blue in the 
Phaedrus. It was there by implication in both Phaedo and Republic when soul 
was seen as a principle of Life, or bound up with the Idea of Life; unfortu-
- k -
nately this notion was allowed to stand on equal terms with others barely
/ ?compatible with it - such as that of soul's likeness to the static Ideas - 
and one is led to conclude that Plato was not then fully aware of the implica­
tions of what he was asserting.
A much-discussed question is the relationship of this doctrine of 
soul as source of motion to the problem of the pre-cosmic chaos at 
Tim. k9& ff., and a number of scholars in recent years have used the one to
a
explain the other. For at 53&2 in particular we read how the Receptacle, 
itself in motion, moves the four 'kinds' ( ) which it has received into
itself, thus separating the 'unlike' sorts farthest from one another, and 
bringing 'like' kinds close together; so that even in this pre-cosmic world 
there is some sort of organisation, some region to which each 'kind' gravitates. 
Before that they are 'without plan* (or 'without pattern', or 'without propor­
tion', sind 'without measure* ( ^ ) . It is the action of the
Receptacle itself, apparently, which gives them some sort of primitive 
organisation. It is when they are in this latter state - a state qualified
ñ / 23
as 'what one would expect from a thing when “£05 is absent from it* - that
the Demiurge intervenes. The point at issue is whether the power of motion
here expressly attributed to the Receptacle indicates the presence of soul or
not. One can begin by saying that in the Phaedrus and Laws the argumentation
is very generalized and schematic ; no reference is made to pre-cosmic states,
2k
and understandably so, since the context does not demand them. In addition,
the reader coming new to the text can be forgiven for assuming that in these
two dialogues the movement referred to is that which he sees operating in the
world around him, and that the 'bodies' in question are those with which he is
acquainted in the world of everyday experience ; in a word the movement which
is to be found in an (already) organized universe. How far it would apply, if
at all, to a pre-cosmos is hard to see. It was argued by Plutarch that it
25
definitely does apply to the pre-cosmos; by most modern scholars, following 
Proclus, that it applies to that element in the cosmos which talk of a pre- 
cosmos is meant to symbolize; by Herter that it ought logically to have 
applied to the pre-cosmos (real or metaphorical) but that it does not appear 
to do so . 27 Certainly the passage 52e-53c (like 3Qa3-5) offers no hint of the 
presence of Soul, rational or irrational. While it must be admitted that ~the 
argumentum e silentio is often a foundation on quicksands, in this particular 
instance it seems to have more cogency than usual. If the pre-cosmic chaos did 
possess soul, that soul is part of what the Demiurge 'took over'; he did not
-  5  -
create it. It will also be an irrational soul, since it does not possess the 
exclusively rational circular motions with which (rational) World Soul is
pO
endowed. These conclusions combined lead one to doubt any thesis that such
an irrational soul is to be included within World Soul as outlined in the
Timaeus, since it is apparently both distinct from it and different in kind from 
29it. If, however, one still accepts the notion of soul as the motive force of
the pre-cosmic chaos, though not as 'part' of World Soul, one is left with the
conclusion that there are or were two distinct psychic forces in the universe,
one rational, one irrational. But in the Politicus myth Plato rejects the
30notion of two opposing divinities in the universe, and one could argue that
the notion of two opposing 'psychic agents' would be open to the same objection.
(On the other hand, there is no particular reason why Plato should not have
changed his mind; the problem is sufficiently puzzling to give pause to the
most confident). The most basic objection to the theory, however, seems to be
as follows: the notion of a soul other than that created by the Demiurge is so
crucial in its implications that it seems incredible that Plato should not have
given clear indication of its presence. To say that one can 'infer' its
presence from the evidence of the Phaedrus and Laws is not enough. For, if
Owen and others are right, both Phaedrus and Laws may well have been written 
31after the Timaeus, and if this is the case one would be engaged in the dubious
task of interpreting an earlier dialogue in the light of later ones. But even
if, for the sake of argument, one granted that the Phaedrus pre-dates the Timaeus,
it is still far from evident that both are talking about the same thing. In the
Phaedrus, for example, it is natural to assume that the movement in question is
that which obtains among bodies in the fairly organized cosmos known to us by
sense experience; to infer that it also applies to the pre-cosmic world where
duration is not Time and the bodily (i.e. organized bodies which we can
recognize) is as yet non-existent, is less easy. The Phaedrus seems to be
saying that soul is the cause of all movement in an organized world, a world
measurable by Time. In a non-organized world not measurable by Time one can
32wonder whether the movement in question has anything to do with this. At this 
stage words start to break down under the strain. Plato is compelled to give 
some description of the pre-cosmic chaos, and talk of movement in such a world 
is no more and no less intelligible than phrases like 'before this'(Tf o Τουτου ) 
(53a8) in the same passage, when Time has been admitted to be absent. So Herter 
seems right in saying that the doctrine of Phaedrus suad Laws is not to be 
applied to the Timaeus, but perhaps unjust in saying that logically it ought to
-  6 -
have been. Plato, as far as I can see, is dealing in two instances with two 
completely different types of motion, the one accepted and universally admitted, 
and operating in an organized world of temporal succession, the other a 
pis aller trying to describe a reality in every sense different. If this 
analysis is correct, there seems no reason to reproach Plato here with lack of 
logic, though on points of clarity he may leave a lot to be desired.
University of Calgary. Thomas M. Robinson.
NOTES
1 . A.-J. Festugiere, Platon et l'Orient, Rev. de Philologie 3, Ser. 21, 1947, ρ·21.
Like Posidonius, he takes the argument to refer to World Soul.
2. P. Frutiger, Les Mythes de Platon, Paris, 1930» PP· 130-4.
3 . J. B. Skemp, The Theory of Motion in Plato's later dialogues, Cambridge,
1942, η. 3, η. 1 , and A.-J. Festugiere, Revue des Etudes Grecques,
1946-7, (Vols. 59-60), p. 496.
4. Hermias, Commentary, ed. P. Couvreur, Paris, 1901, ad loc.
5 . ibid.
6 . ibid.
7 . Tim. 4lc7, 69c3·
8 . 245c5.
9 . Ox. Pap. ΙΟΙ?·
10. See note 11.
11. For the references and comment (both on these and L. Robin) see C. Diano,
Parola del Passato 2, 1947, pp. 189-92. For J. L. Ackrill's comment 
see Mind LXII, 1953, p. 278.
12. Diano, loc.cit. pp. 19O ff. For a number of recent comments on the subject
see H. Cherniss, Plato (1950-7), Lustrum 4-5, 1959 (Band 4) - i960, 
p. 137. The most telling criticism of Robin's arguments for οώχοκ-ηΑ|το$ 
is that of Diano, followed by W. J. Verdenius, Notes on Plato's 
Phaedrus, Mnemosyne IV, 8 , 1955» P· 276. Robin has made the opening 
lines into an Aristotelian syllogism, taking at c6 as adversative, 
and at c7 as consecutive (see his translation ad loc., Bude edition). 
Diano points out how &i can equally well be progressive, and ¿7 
emphatic, thereby changing the character of the argument considerably.
At c5 the words T» yàp &ει k Βάλτοι/ are really a
definition, as Diano sees (p. 191). As such, it is the argument's 
conclusion, rather than its starting-point. It gains by being placed 
startlingly at the beginning, in the maimer of a textbook definition; 
what follows is an explicatio and probatio of what it contained 
succinctly.
1 3. Edition of Phaedrus, p. 65.
14. art.cit., p. 278.
15. Herraias, loc.cit., p. IO3 , 3 ff.
16 . On the affinities between the two arguments see Hackforth, op.cit., p. 6 8»
who refers to Skemp, Frutiger and Bury. Add H. Cherniss, Aristotle's 
Criticism of Plato and the Academy, Vol. I, Baltimore, 1944, pp. 435-8, 
and H. Cherniss, The Sources of Evil According to Plato, Proc. Am. 
Philosoph. Society 98, 1954, p. 208. These scholars take it for 
granted that Plato got his idea of psychic movement from the observation 
of living things (e.g. Hackforth, op.cit., p. 6 8, sind Cherniss, op.cit.,
(ii)
16.(continued)
pp. 435-8). Festugiere, however, has argued that he took it from 
'la decouverte purement grecque de la régularité'" des mouvements 
célestes' (art.cit., p. 21). In this he is followed by V. Martin,
Sur la condamnation des athées par Platon au Xe Livre des Lois,
Studia Philosophica XI, 1951 s P· 1Ï6, who also allows some cogency 
to the accepted explanation, p. 117» If this guess is correct, the 
line of reasoning seems to be as follows:
(a) the circular motion of the heavenly bodies manifests the opera­
tion of intelligence ( <^>£5 ) (Tim., passim).
(b) intelligence cannot arise apart from soul (Tim. 30b3, Sophist 
249a4-8).
(c) soul, with intelligence, is consequently responsible for the 
movement of heavenly bodies.
(d) by analogy, the same reasoning will be applicable to all noetic 
souls, celestial or otherwise.
The strength of this argument, if it genuinely represents Plato's 
thought, is that it accounts for the motive power of the noetic 
soul (see notes 6 and 7 of this paper) - i.e. the only soul 
apparently in question in the Phaedrus argument. In the Laws, 
however, the soul which is the source of movement is something much 
wider than the noetic soul: it is in itself neutral, only taking on
ethical color when seen as voúV irpo<r or c v y -
y t v o ^ l v ^  . This seems to lay stress on the nature of soul as a 
vital principle, the sine qua non of all activity, good or bad 
(V. Martin, art.cit., p. 120), rather than soul as essentially 
characterized by intelligence and 'care' ( *1 Xf iw ) (the Phaedrus 
position), and here Festugiere's explanation hardly fits.
17· For a study of the doctrine of movement in Empedocles, Alcmaeon and the 
Pythagoreans see J. B. Skemp, op.cit. (His views on Alcmaeon are 
criticized by Festugiere, Revue des Etudes Grecques 1945, Vol. 5 8, 
pp. 59-63)· H. C. Baldry, (Embryological Analogies in pre-Socratic 
Cosmogony, CQ XXVI, 1932, pp. 27-34) bas shown, I think convincingly, 
that Anaximander saw the world as a living creature, in many ways 
like a foetus. For an account of soul as source of motion in 
Alcmaeon, Anaxagoras and Diogenes of Apollonia see A. Dies, Autour 
de Platon, Paris, 1927» p. 536. For Aristotle's views on soul as 
a principle of motion among pre-Socratic thinkers see de an. 403b24 ff., 
and compare Phys. VIII, 9} 264bl7~266a5·
l8 . Cherniss seems to me to go beyond the evidence when, in seeing a connection 
between the final proof of the Phaedo and that in the Phaedrus, he 
identifies the 'idea of life' with the 'idea of motion' (op.cit., 
pp. 435-8). Compare H. Cherniss, Gnomon 22, 1950? Ρ· 208, where he 
makes the point that the notion of self-motion is to be found as 
early as Charmides l68e. To have a notion, however, is not 
necessarily to see its implications. If, at the time when he wrote 
the Phaedo, Plato really did see all the implications of the notion 
of the 'idea of life®, it is hard to think that he would have painted 
the very static portrait of that he did. For a different














Skemp, op.cit.» pp. 77-78 and Cherniss, art.clt., p. 25· ■ Both use the 
same notions of 'first order' (Tp^Towpy</$ ) and 'second order*
poop ί %^ ) movement at Laws 8 9 7 a k -5 to prove rather different 
things. For Skemp the 'second order' movements are the 'necessary 
conditions' ( ) of Timaeus and Phaedo: that is, they are
the purely mechanical sine quibus non of the (psychic) actions of 
intelligence and Necessity. In this way the Laws are used to bolster 
a view of soul, rational or irrational, as the direct ( )
cause of all movement. For Cherniss (rational) soul is the indirect 
(though ultimate) cause of all movement: this is based on his
assumption that the 'first order' and 'second order' movements of 
Laws 897a4-5 stand for 'primary' and 'secondary' causation respectively 
and that they find their exact parallel at Tim. k 6 e in the causes:
(a) 'which work with intelligence to produce what is good and 
desirable}' and
(b) 'which being destitute of reason, produce their sundry effects 
at random and without order.'
(b), on his analysis, are the side-effects of (a), and, while 
serving no directly rational end, find their fons et origo in 
rational soul all the same. The point to notice is that soul is 
taken to be rational; Cherniss will not concede that there is an 
irrational World Soul (Skemp) or part of World Soul (F. M. Cornford, 
Plato's Cosmology, London, 1937» P« 208) represented by Necessity 
(Skemp) or by the Different (Cornford). See also H. Herter,




See G. Vlastos, The disorderly Motion in the Timaeus, CQ XXXIII, 1939» 
p. 78.
de an. procréât, in Tim. 10l6c-d.
Proclus In Tim. 323b (Diehl III, 273/31-32); J. Moreau, L'Ame du Monde
de Platon aux Stoïciens, Paris, 1939» 25 ff., 39 ff.» W. F. R. Hardie, 
A Study in Plato, Oxford, 1936, p. 152; A. E, Taylor, A Commentary 
on Plato's Timaeus, Oxford, 1928, pp. 115 ff«, 352 ff., 390 f;
F. M. Cornford, op.cit., p. 207.
H. Herter, op.cit., pp. 3^3» n. 55» and 3^6.
Several scholars have taken it for granted that the Circle of the Different 
in World Soul is or represents irrationality. See L. Robin, Platon, 
Paris, 1935» P* 328; F. M. Cornford, op.cit., pp. 76, 96, II8-II9 »
1^  n. 2 and 208; A. D. Winspear, The Genesis of Plato's Thought,
New York, 1956, p. 332, and G. Morrow, Necessity and Persuasion in 
Plato's Timaeus, Philos. Review 59» 1950, pp. 162-163· But there is 
no indication in the first that the composition of the one is in any 
way different from that of the other. True, both have different
(iv)
2 8. (continued)
provinces, different spheres of influence. The Same has to do with 
the eternally stable world of the Ideas, a world only penetrated by 
pure intelligence, while the Different deals with the sub-rational 
world of sense-experience. But it still approaches the world of 
sense in the most rational manner compatible with that exiguous amount 
of reality which such a world enjoys, and compatible with such a 
world's inherent inability to be fully comprehended by rational 
analysis. Given the nature of the subject-matter, the Different will 
never come to conclusions other than ί°$ > ίυ an<^  T 1 rxiij ; but its 
rational activity is made clear by the way it can guarantee that any 
such i'fÇ'Li and TCnr-rtis will be factually correct. See J. B. Skemp, 
op.cit., pp. 208-9, n. 5» and J. Gould, The Development of Plato's 
Ethics, Cambridge, 1955» p· 199·
29. No doubt this is one reason why Aristotle (Met. A , 1072a l) says that
Plato's ¿¿to ί^-&> wt'/oCv' is only ενι/τε ; as he goes on to
say (a2 ), 6Vttpe* ί *ρ κ-Λ t-D â  '/“X‘7 ? <1 j 1/ ·
See Herter, art.cit., p. 329, a· 6 , and A. Rivaud, Le problème du 
devenir et la notion de la matière dans la philosophie grecque depuis 
les origines jusqu'à Théophraste. These, Paris, I906, p. 337·
T. Gould (Platonic Love, London, I963, p. 29) suggests that the pre­
cosmos is described as in chaotic motion to make the most complete 
contrast with the static permanence of the Ideas, where Intelligence 
is supremely manifest.
3 0. 270al-2 .
3 1. For the arguments see G. E. L. Owen, The Place of the Timaeus in Plato's
dialogues, CQ, N.S. 3» 1953» PP· 79-95· He is followed by J. Gould, 
op.cit., p. 202, n. 3» D* W. Hamlyn, The Communion of forms and the 
development of Plato's logic, Phil. Quart. V, 1955, p· 290, n. 3;
D. A. Sees, Bipartition of the soul in the early Academy, JHS 77»
Part I, 1957» P· II3 » n. 29; and C. Strang, Plato and the Third Man, 
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplem. Vol. XXXVII, 1963» 
pp. 1^7-6^. W. G. Runciman,(Plato's Later Epistemology, Cambridge,
1962, p. k ) while still somewhat diffident, feels that Owen has at 
any rate tested the accepted dating of the Timaeus. For extended 
criticisms of Owen's view see H. Cherniss, The Relationship of the 
Timaeus to Plato's later Dialogues, A. J. Phil. LXXCIII, 3» 1957» 
pp. 223-66, and J. Rist, The Order of the later dialogues of Plato, 
Phoenix, XIV, i960, pp. 207-221. See also the postscript in 
J. B. Skemp's edition of the Politicus.
32. Cornford (op.cit., p. 203) finds 'bodily changes' in the pre-cosmic chaos,
and so argues (from the Phaedrus and Laws X) to the presence in it of 
an (irrational) soul. In this he seems to stress the wrong alternatives 
in the two ambiguous terms 'change' and 'bodily' which Plato is using.
It is true that the Demiurge is said to 'take over' all that was 
visible (30a3-if), but one need hardly conclude, with Proclus, that the 
bodily must therefore be present in the pre-cosmic chaos, if only in 
some minimal way. (See Cornford, op.cit.» p. 205). Plato himself 
only talks about and » and there is no reason to
think they necessarily obey the same rules as organized bodies. The 
word 'visible* is probably used loosely for 'non-spiritual' or 
'non-psychic', in much the same way as in the Phaedo soul is called
(v)
3 2. (continued)
'invisible' where one might have said 'non-material'. See 
Phaedo 79a6 ff., where reality is divided into 'the visible* 
and 'the invisible', the objects of 'opinion' and 'knowledge' 
respectively, and 79bl2 ff., where soul is said to be more of 
the class of things 'invisible' than 'visible'.
